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Abstract 
Traditional training for Navy technicians is labor intensive, removes skilled sailors from the 
fleet, requires capital infrastructure, and may require more time than alternative means of 
acquiring knowledge. The U.S. Navy decided in the early 2000s to replace traditional, 
instructor-led schoolhouse training with Computer Based Training (CBT). Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that CBT failed to sufficiently prepare new sailors for on board maintenance and 
operations. To determine the validity of this claim, we examine data for the AN/SQQ-89(v) 
sonar. We analyze whether the U.S. Navy’s introduction of CBT significantly affected fleet 
maintenance costs, actions, and training requirements. Preliminary results suggest that CBT 
adversely impacts costs, actions, and maintenance hours for the sonar system, suggesting 
that the reduction in training costs experienced with the use of CBT may have been 
transferred to fleet operations costs, supporting the anecdotal evidence. 
Introduction 
The majority of specialized skills training (known as class “A” and “C” schools) in the 
United States Navy has traditionally been provided in a classroom setting by instructors in 
Navy schoolhouses. The growing cost of training and concerns that future training demand 
would exceed capacity, led to an Executive Review of Navy Training (ERNT) in 2000. The 
ERNT group recommended using new training technologies to meet future demands while 
reducing training costs and time (United States Navy Chief of Naval Operations, 2001).1 
Based, in part, on these recommendations, the U.S. Navy implemented Computer Based 
Training (CBT) in 2003, expecting that CBT would increase training capacity and reduce the 
time and cost of training, while maintaining training quality.2  
While it seems reasonable that CBT may lower costs and maintain quality for 
relatively simple tasks, it may not be as effective for specialized, knowledge-intensive skills. 
In 2009, the Naval Inspector General found that although CBT did reduce training time 
relative to the A and C schools, it may not have adequately prepared sailors for their initial 
duty assignments. Anecdotal evidence suggested that sailors trained with CBT did not 
                                            
 
 
1 Part of the navy’s new strategy included use of new training technologies such as, distributed learning, 
computer based training, collaborative learning, and computer-mediated learning. 
2 CBT is defined as “individual or group self-paced instruction using a computer as the primary training medium, 
to include web-delivered Navy E-Learning (NEL)” (Naval Inspector General 2009, ii). 
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possess the required Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, and Tools (KSATs) to perform their duties 
effectively (Ewing, 2009; Naval Inspector General, 2009). Initial evidence also suggests that 
the use of CBT may have transferred these costs to the operational fleet (Gibson, 2012). To 
understand the operational cost impact of CBT we need to know whether CBT reduced the 
overall cost of operations and maintenance, including on-the-job training, unscheduled 
maintenance actions, and the length of repairs for systems requiring intensive education and 
training. 
In this study, we examine the impact of CBT on a single system, the AN/SQQ-89(v) 
sonar3, to determine whether CBT significantly altered fleet maintenance costs, actions, and 
training requirements for this system. If CBT has effectively trained personnel, then costs, 
labor hours, and corrective maintenance actions should either remain constant or decline. 
On the other hand, if CBT is an ineffective replacement for traditional ‘hands-on’ training, 
then, after controlling for other factors, costs, labor hours, and corrective maintenance 
actions should increase. We recognize that focusing on one system will limit the inferences 
about CBT’s effect, however, we maintain that these inferences will still of be interest to 
practitioners and policymakers alike. 
The next section briefly discusses the Navy’s traditional and computer based 
training. The third section describes the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar system and the data used in 
this study. The fourth section analyzes whether CBT has affected maintenance costs, 
actions, or time. The last section concludes and offers directions for future research. 
Navy Training 
U.S. Navy sailors receive training throughout their careers. Once a recruit has 
completed basic training, he or she will attend specialized skill training in an occupational 
specialty or “rating.” In-rate training begins in a class “A” school,4 then, depending on the 
rating, a sailor may also attend additional in-rate training in a “C” school.5 After completing 
school training, the sailor is assigned to an initial duty station, where training will continue 
“on-the-job” as he or she gains real world experience in their specialized skill. Additionally, 
sailors can expect to receive general military training in topics ranging from electrical safety 
to suicide prevention.  
Until the early 2000s, the navy had conducted in-rate training in a traditional 
schoolhouse setting using more experienced sailors (subject matter experts) to instruct new 
sailors. These instructors have practical experience with the work and responsibilities of 
newly rated sailors and can supplement classroom material with anecdotes and tips from 
their own career experiences (Hall & Freda, 1982; Naval Inspector General, 2009). 
In addition to lectures, sailors reinforce their understanding of the material through 
hands-on practice on the same equipment they will use and maintain in the Fleet, and are 
                                            
 
 
3 The AN/SQQ-89(v) surface ship Anti-Submarine (ASW) Warfare combat system is an integrated network of 
sonar systems designed to search, detect, classify, and engage ASW threats (Lockheed Martin, 2009) 
4 For further information on qualifications for and assignments to class “A” schools, see MILPERSMAN 1306-
618, ‘Class “A” School and Rating Entry Requirements.’  Available at http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/milpersman/1000/1300Assignment/Documents/1306-618.pdf 
5 A submarine Fire Control Technician, for example, attends a 27 to 33 week A school course on basic skills, 
followed potentially by a C school course on advanced maintenance topics, including computer language skills 
and maintenance of specific weaponry.  
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asked to troubleshoot malfunctions in a controlled environment. Because the instructors are 
observing and interacting with the students in person, the delivery of material (lecture or 
practical application) can be tailored to improve the students’ level of comprehension.  
The introduction of CBT in the class A schools has considerably altered the nature of 
instruction. Using a personal computer, sailors can progress through learning modules at 
their own pace or work together in groups to complete the course material (Barker, 2010). 
There are periodic knowledge assessments throughout the module, followed by a 
comprehensive evaluation at the end. In both self-paced or group-driven CBT, the navy has 
replaced instructors with facilitators who are primarily concerned with maintaining order in 
the classroom, monitoring student progress, and providing technology assistance. 
Facilitators do not provide instruction or answer questions related to the course content. The 
removal of instructors from the classroom may have a detrimental effect on learning for 
those students who cannot grasp the material on their own. 
 In 2010 GAO noted that the fleet had concerns over the level of knowledge that 
sailors and officers have received through CBT (GAO, 2010). In fleet interviews, some 
commands reported that specialty qualification time was nearly double what it had been 
before the CBT’s introduction (Naval Inspector General, 2009). Unfortunately, the navy has 
focused on the cost of training and has not developed metrics to examine training outcomes, 
potentially reducing readiness (GAO, 2010; Novak, 2010). 
The AN/SQQ-89(v) Sonar System 
In this study we examine the effect of CBT on a single navy system, the AN/SQQ-
89(v) sonar system. We selected the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar system because it is fielded 
throughout the operational fleet before and after the implementation of CBT with relatively 
consistent manning. The AN/SQQ-89(v) surface ship Anti-Submarine (ASW) Warfare 
combat system is an integrated network of sonar systems designed to search, detect, 
classify, and engage ASW threats (Lockheed Martin, 2009). The system is currently installed 
on CG-47 class cruisers, DDG-51 class destroyers, and FFG-7 class frigates. The AN/SQQ-
89(v) employs a variety of sensors that can transmit and receive acoustic data to detect and 
classify threats (Johns, 1998).  
The AN/SQQ-89(v) is maintained and operated by sonar technicians (STGs). All 
sailors selected for this duty attend STG A school. At A school they learn the basic 
principles of oceanography and sound. Following A school, STGs who are strictly operators 
report to a Sonar Operator course, while maintainers attend C school, where they learn the 
technical skills required to maintain the equipment present on their reporting ship (Navy 
Personnel Command, 2012).  
Analysis & Results 
To test the hypothesis of whether the introduction of CBT significantly influenced 
system maintenance and operation we define three dependent variables of interest: 
Organization Parts Costs (OrgParts), Corrective Organizational and Intermediate 
Maintenance Actions (OrgActions), and Organization Labor Man-Hours (Orghours). If CBT 
does not detract from sailor ability, then CBT should have no (or negative) impact on the 
dependent variables. If, however, CBT fails to adequately prepare sailors for operating and 
maintaining these systems to the degree of traditional training, then there should be an 
increase in parts costs, maintenance actions, and man-hours. 
We define Computer Based Training (CBT) as a dummy variable that is 0 before 
2004 and 1 afterwards and introduce several control variables: billets authorized for enlisted 
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grades E-1 to E-6 (BAE); the Navy Manning Plan for enlisted personnel in grades E-1 to E-6 
(NMPE); number of enlisted in grades E-1 to E-6 currently on board (COBE); and the 
number of days underway in a given fiscal year (UW). A matrix Z includes the radar variant, 
radar’s installation year, type of ship, and homeport location. We employ panel data and 
thus specify the general estimation form as follows:  
  (1) 
where  and denote the unobservable individual ship and time effects, 
respectively. The term uit is a random walk. The subscripts  and  denote ship and time 
period, respectively.  
To examine the hypothesized influence of CBT on AN/SQQ-89(v) parts costs, 
maintenance man hours, and maintenance actions, we select those variants on board prior 
to and following CBT’s introduction into the A and C schools. Of the 15 possible variants, we 
utilize data on five variants for the empirical analysis from FY 1999 through FY 2010. Our 
final data set contains 526 observations on 68 ships from FY 1999 to FY 2010. Table 1 
presents the 68 ships that have these variants onboard.  
We present results from pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimators, explicitly 
assuming that CBT is exogenous to the dependent variables; as CBT is a policy decision, 
this is a reasonable assumption. We find that CBT’s use has adversely influenced the parts 
costs, actions, and labor hours associated with operating and maintaining the AN/SQQ-
89(v). This result is consistent when we control for the type of ship, radar variant, homeport, 
and unobservable ship and time characteristics. These results suggest that the navy has 
traded an explicit training cost for an obscured cost in terms of parts, maintenance actions, 
labor hours, and readiness. 
Our analysis suggests that using CBT increases Organizational Parts Costs by 
approximately $4,971 per year at the 1% level of significance (Table 4). For a given system 
on a ship, this suggests a 20 to 50% increase in maintenance costs over time. We also find 
that CBT increases Corrective Maintenance Actions by approximately 32 per year at the 1% 
level of significance (Table 5). For a given system on a ship, this suggests a significant 
percentage increase in maintenance actions. Finally, we estimate that introducing CBT 
inflates the number of Organization Labor Hours by 730 hours at the 1% level of significance 
(Table 6). 
Our results support the anecdotal arguments that CBT negatively impacts sailor 
performance on ships, affecting parts costs, maintenance actions, and maintenance labor 
hours. While limited to one system, this result suggests that the navy has reduced the cost 
of labor and equipment in schoolhouses at the expense of operational cost and 
effectiveness (parts, maintenance, and labor hours) on board ships. Further research is 
important to understand whether these adverse impacts are present in different systems. 
Conclusions and Future Research 
In 2001, ERNT released its report, Revolution in Training: Executive Review of Navy 
Training Final Report, which led to a major overhaul in the U.S. Navy’s training practices, 
including the use of CBT in A and C schools. Anecdotal evidence from the Fleet suggested 
that the quality of training received by sailors through CBT was not as good as the training 
received in traditional schoolhouses. 
In this study, we focus on a single navy system, the AN/SQQ-89(v) sonar system, to 
examine the effects of the conversion to CBT on maintenance. Controlling for the navy’s 
planning for manning the system, the number of billets authorized, and the number of 
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personnel on board, we find that CBT adversely impacted costs, actions, and maintenance 
hours. These preliminary results provide, for the first time in the literature, empirical 
evidence CBT’s negative impact with respect to the U.S. military. 
The estimation of (1) raises several econometric issues including serial correlation, 
heteroskedasticity, and the possibility of ship and time-specific effects. We will explore 
whether our results are fragile to the choice of estimator in future research. Future research 
should also explore whether CBT has affected other systems in a similar manner. This 
question is of direct policy and financial interest to the navy; navy expenditures may rise 
from increases in costs and actions.  
Table 1. List of Ships and AN/SQQ-89(v) System Variants6  
 
                                            
 
 
6 For further discussion of the ship types and sonar types, please see (Gibson, 2012). 
(V)2 SHIP HOMEPORT (V)3 SHIP HOMEPORT (V)6 SHIP HOMEPORT
CG 55 LEYTE GULF Norfolk, VA CG 56 SAN JACINTO Norfolk, VA CG 68 ANZIO Norfolk, VA
FFG 8 MCINERNEY Mayport, FL CG 57 LAKE CHAMPLAIN San Diego, CA CG 69 VICKSBURG Mayport, FL
FFG 28 BOONE Mayport, FL CG 58 PHILIPPINE SEA Mayport, FL CG 70 LAKE ERIE Pearl Harbor, HI
FFG 29 STEPHEN W GROVESMayport, FL CG 71 CAPE ST GEORGE San Diego, CA
FFG 32 JOHN HALL Mayport, FL (V)4 SHIP HOMEPORT CG 72 VELLA GULF Norfolk, VA
FFG 33 JARRET San Diego, CA DDG 51 ARLEIGH BURKE Norfolk, VA DDG 52 BARRY Norfolk, VA
FFG 36 UNDERWOOD Mayport, FL DDG 53 JOHN PAUL JONES San Diego, CA
FFG 38 CURTS San Diego, CA DDG 54 CURTIS WILBUR Yokosuka, Japan
FFG 39 DOYLE Mayport, FL DDG 55 STOUT Norfolk, VA
FFG 40 HALYBURTON Mayport, FL DDG 56 JOHN S. MCCAIN Yokosuka, Japan
FFG 41 MCCLUSKY San Diego, CA DDG 57 MITSCHER Norfolk, VA
FFG 42 KLAKRING Mayport, FL DDG 58 LABOON Norfolk, VA
FFG 43 THACH San Diego, CA DDG 59 RUSSELL Pearl Harbor, HI
FFG 45 DE WERT Mayport, FL DDG 60 PAUL HAMILTON Pearl Harbor, HI
FFG 46 RENTZ San Diego, CA DDG 61 RAMAGE Norfolk, VA
FFG 47 NICHOLAS Norfolk, VA DDG 63 STETHEM Yokosuka, Japan
FFG 48 VANDEGRIFT San Diego, CA (V)7 SHIP HOMEPORT DDG 64 CARNEY Mayport, FL
FFG 49 ROBERT G BRADLEY Mayport, FL CG 66 HUE CITY Mayport, FL DDG 65 BENFOLD San Diego, CA
FFG 53 HAWES Norfolk, VA CG 67 SHILOH Yokosuka, Japan DDG 66 GONZALEZ Norfolk, VA
FFG 55 ELROD Norfolk, VA DDG 67 COLE Norfolk, VA
FFG 56 SIMPSON Mayport, FL (V)9 SHIP HOMEPORT DDG 68 THE SULLIVANS San Diego, CA
FFG 57 REUBEN JAMES Pearl Harbor, HI FFG 37 CROMMELIN Pearl Harbor, HI DDG 69 MILIUS San Diego, CA
FFG 58 SAMUEL B ROBERTS Mayport, FL FFG 50 TAYLOR Mayport, FL DDG 70 HOPPER Pearl Harbor, HI
FFG 59 KAUFFMAN Norfolk, VA FFG 51 GARY San Diego, CA DDG 71 ROSS Norfolk, VA
FFG 60 RODNEY M. DAVIS Everett, WA FFG 52 CARR Norfolk, VA DDG 72 MAHAN Norfolk, VA
FFG 61 INGRAHAM Everett, WA FFG 54 FORD Everett, WA DDG 73 DECATUR San Diego, CA
DDG 74 MCFAUL Norfolk, VA
DDG 75 DONALD COOK Norfolk, VA
DDG 76 HIGGINS San Diego, CA
DDG 77 O'KANE Pearl Harbor, HI
DDG 78 PORTER Norfolk, VA
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Table 2. Variable Definitions 
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Days Underway Days spent at sea Days VAMOSC 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Series N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Organizational Parts Costs 802 8439.80 9434.82 0 65839.71 
Corrective Maintenance Actions 793 75.10 54.05 4 447 
Organizational Labor Hours 801 1012.60 1029.57 7 12079 
Authorized on Board, E1 through E6 808 12.66 3.66 6 18 
Navy Manning Plan, E1 through E6 812 12.8 4.09 5 20 
Currently on Board, E1 through E6 811 12.92 4.13 4 24 
Days Underway 543 135.80 48.77 24 281 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= = - 437 - 
Table 4. Estimates for the Impact of CBT on Organizational Parts Costs 
(Constant FY 11 Dollars) 



































Note. **, *, + denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5. Estimates for the Impact of CBT on Corrective Maintenance Actions 



































Note. **, *, + denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6. Organizational Maintenance Hours 



































Note. **, *, + denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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